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TL;DR
Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Security researcher Scott Helme’s Report URI analysis says the code reached visitors to 178 organisations’ sites on November 16, attempting to steal data and redirect some mobile devices to exploit kits. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability and cleaned affected projects, but the attack’s full scope and any resulting compromise have not been established.
Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, after security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found the code on websites associated with 178 organisations. The incident matters because those sites loaded the code through a third-party script they had already chosen to use, exposing visitors to attempted data theft and other malicious activity without the sites themselves necessarily being hacked.
Report URI says it checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the malicious code in 188 snippets associated with 178 organisations. It cautioned that the true number may be higher. BleepingComputer separately reported that urlscan.io scans showed the script loading or attempting to load on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN and Salesforce. A listed organisation does not mean its entire website, product or customer base was affected: some entries were individual subdomains or tools.
According to Report URI, the injected JavaScript could replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses on a page or in a visitor’s clipboard, capture payment-card details entered into a site’s own form fields, and collect cookies or screenshots. The analysis says the code also directed some iPhones and iPads toward the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Hudson Rock, which examined that mobile-device activity, described its findings as delivery observations, not demonstrated iPhone compromises. The available reporting does not establish that every attempted action succeeded or that visitors’ devices were compromised.
Report URI says it first observed an Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on November 16, and that infected Optimizely files had been cleaned by 23:11 UTC that day. The company’s November 17 status update said it had fixed the vulnerability and removed injected code from affected projects. Optimizely also told BleepingComputer it had ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts and notified customers it considered affected.
Optimizely script attack · Nov 13 – Nov 17, 2026
How one trusted script carried malware to 178 websites
The sites were not hacked themselves. The code arrived inside a file they loaded on purpose.
The route (schematic)
Whether any iPhone was compromised has not been shown.
Timeline (UTC)
- Nov 13Earlier wave through three other providers’ scriptsKissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media
- Nov 16 04:21First Optimizely injection seen
- 08:28Address-swapping payload first seen on a site
- 13:43Card skimmer added
- 17:13iPhone exploit delivery widened
- 19:24Report URI sweep: 186 of 1,611 snippets infected
- 21:52Only 1 of 188 infected snippets left
- 23:11All infected Optimizely files cleaned
- Nov 17 01:02Optimizely confirms the incident on its status page
Sources: Report URI (Scott Helme), Nov 16, 2026, timeline and update of Nov 17; Optimizely status page, Nov 17, 2026; Hudson Rock (Infostealers.com), Nov 16–17, 2026. The route is a schematic.
Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI
A Trusted Script Reached Many Sites
The incident shows how a vulnerability at a shared service can put visitors to many independently operated websites at risk. Customers had intentionally loaded Optimizely’s experimentation script; Report URI says the attacker inserted code into the customer-specific Project JavaScript field, while the rest of each snippet remained untouched. The malicious content was consequently delivered from a source those sites already trusted, rather than from a visible change to each organisation’s own pages.
That makes the incident relevant to both site operators and people who visited affected pages. Report URI’s analysis describes attempted wallet substitution, form-field card skimming, and collection of cookies and screenshots. It says payment details entered into a site’s own fields were within the script’s reach, while card numbers entered into hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were not. These are findings about the code’s reported capabilities, not evidence that every visitor lost data.
Report URI also examined security policies on affected organisations’ sites. It found that 24 of 159 organisations blocked the code and 68 had no such policy. Those figures describe the sites examined, not all organisations or all web security controls. They nevertheless highlight how a customer’s defenses may affect whether a third-party script can run.
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How the Optimizely Injection Worked
Optimizely Web lets organisations run experiments on their pages using a small JavaScript snippet. Each customer’s snippet can include experiments and an optional Project JavaScript field for custom code that runs across pages. Report URI says the attacker wrote code into that field in customer projects. It also says the incident was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack; the affected files were served through Optimizely’s normal delivery setup.
Optimizely’s status page said the vulnerability was in its Experimentation product. The company told BleepingComputer that it involved the account signup flow, but its public statements, as described in the source reporting, did not explain the code-level mechanics that allowed changes to unrelated customer projects. Report URI says it does not know how the attacker gained write access across those projects.
Report URI says the same actor’s injector appeared from November 13 in scripts associated with three other providers—Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media—on sites outside its list of 178 organisations. Hudson Rock also identified that pattern and said how the code entered those services remained unresolved. The reporting does not establish whether these incidents shared the same access method or were part of a single operation.
“An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.”
— Optimizely, in its status-page update on November 17
The Attack’s Reach Is Not Settled
The route to broad project access remains unexplained in the statements described by the source reporting. Optimizely identified a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow and said it had addressed it, but has not publicly detailed how that flaw let an unauthorized party alter multiple customers’ projects. The reporting also does not establish who was responsible.
The 178-organisation figure is based on Report URI’s examination of Optimizely snippets, and the researcher says the actual total may be higher. Conversely, inclusion on the list does not show that all pages or services belonging to an organisation were affected. It is also unclear how many people saw the code, whether any data was successfully taken, whether wallet transfers or card fraud followed, or whether any iPhones were compromised. Hudson Rock explicitly cautioned that its findings about the mobile payload showed delivery, not confirmed infections.
Report URI says the payload was rebuilt 26 times during November 16. That count describes observed revisions, not the number of victims or a measured rise in activity. The extent of any connection between the Optimizely event and earlier code found in scripts from three other providers is also not established in the source material.
Customer Reviews and Incident Findings
Optimizely said it had fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code from affected projects, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. It also said it notified customers it identified as affected. The immediate next step for customers is to review Optimizely project settings and access, check their own incident records and follow any direct guidance from the company. People who visited a site on the relevant date may wish to check for unusual account or payment activity; the reporting does not establish that every visitor needs the same response.
Further clarity depends on details not included in the company’s brief public account: how the signup-flow vulnerability enabled project changes, which customer projects were affected, and whether investigations found successful theft or device compromise. Reporting on the incident may change as Optimizely, affected organisations and security researchers publish additional findings. The source material gives no timetable for a fuller technical disclosure.
Key Questions
What happened through Optimizely?
Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Report URI says visitors to sites associated with 178 organisations received the code on November 16, 2026.
What could the malicious JavaScript do?
Report URI says it attempted to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, capture card details entered into sites’ own form fields, collect cookies and screenshots, and direct some Apple mobile devices toward exploit kits. The findings describe reported capabilities and delivery; they do not prove that every action succeeded.
Were all pages of the named organisations affected?
No. The list includes individual subdomains and tools. Hudson Rock cautioned that an affected subdomain does not establish exposure across an organisation’s entire website, product, customer base or checkout system.
Does the reporting confirm that iPhones were compromised?
No. Hudson Rock characterized its findings as observations of exploit-kit delivery, not demonstrated iPhone compromises. The source reporting does not confirm successful infections or provide a count of affected devices.
What has Optimizely done, and what remains unknown?
Optimizely said it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code from affected projects, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts and notified affected customers. The company has not, in the reporting provided, explained how the signup-flow flaw enabled access to multiple projects or established whether data theft or other harm occurred.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
